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Most of the papers in this symposium conceptualize lawsuits
against the government as instruments used to protect individuals
and minorities from state policies that violate fundamental rights or
discriminate against particular groups. The judiciary, under this
view, exists as the countermajoritarian check on political processes
naturally skewed toward satisfying the preferences of the numerous
or the powerful. Thus, in addition to protecting rights specified in
the Constitution,judicial review is often thought to be most necessary
when one of the triggers mentioned in Carolene Products footnote
four' is present: namely, restriction of the political processes that
could bring about the repeal of undesirable legislation, or discrimination against discrete and insular minorities. Specifically because
they are not elected and accountable, the argument goes, federal
judges are in the best institutional position to police the political
process to prevent majoritarian tyranny and to safeguard the processes that bring about democratic change.
This essay examines a subclass of suits against the government:
those where plaintiffs turn to the judiciary in hopes of gaining greater
representation, power, or control of government. For most of our
nation's history, such suits were seen as involving political questions
outside the province and beyond the capabilities of the judiciary.
When the Court began to intervene, it did so based on the Carolene
Products rationales. The most recent cases-of the last twenty-five
years or so-reveal what I consider two disturbing trends. The first
concerns the co-opting of the Carolene Products rationales for the adjudication of "normal" political conflict. Whereas once plaintiffs ran
to the courthouse as a last resort when the structures of politics systematically closed them out of the legislature, now plaintiffs who have
lost through the "normal" operation of democratic government routinely run to the judiciary for a second bite at the apple. The second
trend involves the supplementing of the Carolene Products rationales
with alternative justifications for judicial intervention into the politi-
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cal process. In a series of decisions, the Court has intervened in the
political process in the name of what can best be described as "tradition," safeguarding processes and institutions from innovations that
are themselves often justified as protecting minorities or providing
greater political access. I conclude this essay by evaluating whether
these unintended and perhaps inevitable consequences have served
to undermine the justifications for even the initial judicial forays into
politics that are normally viewed as crowning, progressive achievements of the modern Court.
I. JUDICIAL INTERVENTION INTO POLITICS-THE SALAD DAYS
Most would time the Court's intervention into politics with the
1962 decision in Baker v. Carr and its progeny over the next decade
that established the one-person, one-vote rule. Because of the vigorous disagreements the Justices expressed in those cases as to whether
they should get involved in the "political thicket ' of redistricting, the
one-person, one-vote cases appear as a watershed in the judiciary's
conceptualization of its role in the political system. This first impression is somewhat misleading, however.
Prior to Baker the Court had intervened several times in the electoral process, sporadically protecting African-American voters by enforcing the guarantees of the Equal Protection Clause and the Fifteenth Amendment. As early as (or depending on your perspective,
as late as) 1915, the Court struck down certain grandfather clauses as

inconsistent with the Fifteenth Amendment.4 And in the following
forty years, it used the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments in the
White Primary Cases to strike down a series of attempts by the Texas
Democratic Party to exclude African-Americans from participating in
both formal and informal candidate nominating processes.5 Just two
years prior to Baker, the Court (with Justice Frankfurter writing for it,
no less) struck down the Tuskeegee racial gerrymander on Fifteenth
Amendment grounds, finding it to be merely a more sophisticated
form of outright disfranchisement.
While prior to Baker the Court intervened (if ever) in only the
most extreme cases of race-based disfranchisement, immediately after
Baker the Court extended its reach into cases where the plaintiffs
were not discrete or insular minorities. Indeed, the Court created
the right to vote out of whole cloth-reading into the Equal Protec2

369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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4 Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915).

5 See Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932);
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Terry v.Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
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tion Clause a protection against discrimination in voting that made
the Fifteenth, Nineteenth, and Twenty-Fourth Amendments superfluous. 7 The bounds of this newly discovered right were not limited

to historically oppressed groups or even discrete or insular minorities; they extended even to thirty-one year old stockbrokers who lived
with their parents and wanted to vote in school board elections." And
once the Court established the right to vote, the rights to run for office and to appear on the ballot, as a party" or a candidate,' represented the next logical jurisprudential step. However, these postBaker cases, like the one-person, one-vote cases themselves, could be
justified by appealing to the first of the Carolene Products rationales,
what John Hart Ely calls-"clearing the channels of political
change."" Judicial action was necessary, it was thought, because incumbent politicians had no incentive to redraw the favorable districts
that elected them, to make the ballot more inclusive, or to expand
the franchise to include voters that might be less reliable supporters.
Although the Court may have been the major agent of political
change in the 1960s and early 1970s, Congress also played an influential role in expanding the franchise and attempting to prevent capture of the electoral process by the powerful. With the Voting Rights
3
Act of 1965,2 Congress eliminated literacy tests and secured to Afri-

can-Americans, and later other groups, the promise of enfranchisement made in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Whereas
Congress' principal concern with the Voting Rights Act was protection of discrete and insular minorities, the Federal Election Campaign Act, particularly as amended in 1974," sought to release the political process from the supposed stranglehold of wealthy campaign
contributors (FECA). At least before Buckley v. Valeo' mauled it beyond recognition, FECA represented for its supporters some hope for
clearing the channels of political change by muting the corrupting
effect of money on the political process.
Like Congress, the national political parties also played a role in
pluralizing and invigorating the electoral process. Throughout this
time period, the parties slowly expanded the number of states that
nominated their candidates in direct primaries, as opposed to back7
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Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
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1242 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 (2000).

13 Not too long before Baker, the Court had upheld literacy tests as constitutional. Lassiter
v.
Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
14 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-442 (2000).
15424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
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rooms filled with much smoke and few party apparatchiks. With the
reforms of the early 1970s, the Democratic Party completely transformed the national party conventions that would follow: providing
for proportional representation according to race and gender, and
enacting a series of reforms that transferred power from party leaders
to the mass party membership."
II. THE CO-OPTATION OF CAROLENE PRODUCTS
The judicial and legislative innovations of the 1960s had several
unintended, even if not entirely unforeseeable, consequences. In
their dissents in Baker v. Carr17 and Reynolds v. Sims,' Justices Frankfurter and Harlan warned ofjudicial entanglement in politics, fearing
both the lack of administrable standards for redistricting and the erosion of confidence and credibility in the judiciary once it involved itself in the inherently political task of drawing district lines. History
has vindicated them, for reasons even beyond those explicit in their
predictions. One of those reasons is the co-optation of the prominority and anti-entrenchment rationales in the service of normal
partisan conflict.
The redistricting arena presents the most glaring examples of this
co-optation. The one-person, one-vote rule has become a vehicle for
pushing redistricting plans into the courts when political losers feel
that their chances of success might be greater. In Karcher v. Daggett,19
the Republican plaintiffs who lost out in the NewJersey congressional
redistricting fight argued successfully that even a 0.2% deviation in
population-a figure well under the margin of error in the census
data used for redistricting-violated the Constitution. Once created,
this supplemental rule of no de minimis population variance then
became a standard claim for each fight in the 1990 and 2000 rounds
of congressional redistricting litigation.20'
Redistricting rules under the Voting Rights Act have fared no better than those arising out of the Constitution when it comes to their
potential for co-optation by political actors. Most recently, New Jer16See generally NELSON W. POLSBY, CONSEQUENCES OF PARTFY REFORM
(1983).
17 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (FrankfurterJ.,
dissenting).
18 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (Harlani., dissenting).
19 462 U.S. 725 (1983).
20 See, e.g., Vieth v. Pennsylvania, 195 F. Supp. 2d 672 (M.D. Pa. 2002) (striking
down redistricting plan with 19-person total deviation). See generally Pamela S. Karlan, The Fire Next Time:
Reapportionment After the 2000 Census, 50 STAN. L. REV. 731, 735-36 (1998) (discussing the partisan use of one person, one vote); id. at 741 (noting that one third of post-1980 redistricting was
done either directly or indirectly by courts). I should note that fights against partisan gerrymanders could be justified as "clearing the channels of political change," since the plaintiffs in
these cases felt that parties in control of the redistricting process were rigging the system for
their advantage.
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sey Republicans challenged the 2002 districts for the state legislature.
To do so, they felt that a claim under Section Two of the Voting
Rights Act presented their best opportunity for forcing the Redistricting Commission to go back to the drawing board on the district lines.
Noticing that several districts had lower percentages of AfricanAmericans than under the previous plan, the Republicans enlisted
some African-American plaintiffs in an ultimately unsuccessful vote
dilution lawsuit. 2'

The Democrats adopted a similar strategy with

Mexican-American plaintiffs in litigation challenging New Mexico's
congressional districts.2
The co-optation of the CaroleneProducts rationales is not limited to
redistricting fights. In its most significant, recent case concerning political parties, for example, the Court declared California's blanket
primary, which allowed any voter to vote in any party's primary in any
race, to be unconstitutional under the First Amendment.2

3

Instead of

4

campaigning against the initiative, the established political parties
(hardly discrete and insular minorities), as well as the minor parties,
challenged the initiative in court, arguing that forcing them to accept
"outsiders" in their primary elections violated their freedom of association. Analogizing political parties to other more-private associations, 5 the Supreme Court agreed with their position. ContrastJones
with Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party,27 discussed later, in which
the Court's upholding of a ballot regulation effectively made it more
difficult for minor parties (with a greater claim on minority status) to
become significant electoral players.
Bush v. Gores represented the worst-case scenario of co-optation of
the CaroleneProducts rationales. The per curiam opinion cited classic
precedent largely justified through appeals to minority protection
21

Page v. Bartels, 144 F. Supp. 2d (D.N.J. 2001) (three-judge court) (holding that a legisla-

tive reapportionment plan did not violate the Voting Rights Act).
22 Jepsen v. Vigil-Giron, No. D-101-CV-200102177 (1st Jud. Dist. Santa Fe County Jan. 2,
2002) (holding that drawing a Hispanic-majority district is not required by the Voting Rights
Act, and that the establishment of this kind of district should be left to the legislature, not the
courts).
23 Cal. Dem. Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000).
See generally Nathaniel Persily, Toward a
Functional Defense of Political Party Autonomy, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 750 (2001) (discussing Jones and
other party primaly cases).
24 See Richard L. Hasen, Parties Take the Initiative (and Vice Versa), 100 COLUM.
L. REV. 731
(2000) (explaining how California's parties sat out the political fight surrounding the initiative
in favor of litigating against it).
25 Jones, 530 U.S.
at 574-75.
261 should note that I agree with the result in Jones and have argued in favor of substantial
constitutional protection for party autonomy based largely on the Carolene Products rationales.
See Persily, supra note 23 (justifying party atitonomy from the standpoint of protection of ninorities and promoting electoral competition).
27 520 U.S. 351 (1997).
28 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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and entrenchment prevention. In support of the halting of recounts
mandated by the new interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause,
2
the Court cited its one-person, one-vote precedents (Reynolds v. Sims, 9
Gray v. Sanders,30 and Moore v. Ogilvie3) and its precedent in striking

down the poll tax (Harperv. Virginia Board of Elections'2). That Bush
was not a "discrete and insular minority

33

or that political institu-

tions, such as the Florida State Legislature or the United States Congress, were ready, willing, and able to vindicate his rights played no
role in the Court's opinion. The equal right to vote included the
equal chance that identical ballots would be counted identically, the
Court concluded, at least in the factual context presented at the time.
Despite the original intent of the Court that manufactured the right
to vote, the right could not be constrained to its purposes: in Bush v.
Gore, it morphed into a cause of action that was judicially cognizable
regardless of the position of power, available alternative forums for
resolution, or even the existence of the injury of the plaintiff.
III. THE COURT'S FOOTNOTE TO FOOTNOTE FOUR
In addition to expanding the constituency for the CaroleneProducts
exceptions to judicial abstinence from political conflict, the Court has
created new rationales forjudicial forays into the political thicket. Although generalization obscures the jurisprudential subtleties and the
differences among the coalitions that have formed to create this new
justification for judicial involvement in politics, the various decisions
might be summarized as protecting certain institutional and political
"traditions." More troubling than the lack of constitutional justification for these moves is the Court's selective, or even made-up, notion
of tradition in the recent political process cases.
The "wrongful-districting" cause of action provides a case in point.
In Shaw v. Reno 4 and its progeny, the Court established an "analytically distinct"" cause of action arising when a state subordinates "traditional districting principles 06 to race in the construction of a legislative district. The Court has enumerated such principles as
"compactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions"3
while recognizing that other variables, such as incumbency protec29 377

U.S. 533
10372 U.S. 368
"4394 U.S. 814
32 383 U.S. 663

(1964).
(1963).
(1969).
(1966).

13United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144,
153 n.4 (1938).

." 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
35 Id. at
652.
Id. at 686 n.8.
I3
.7 Id- at 647
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tion and respect for communities of interest, might make the list in
an individual case. Although the Court originally justified the Shaw
action in the name of preventing racial stereotyping and segregation,
the subsequent cases established that this was not a cause of action
particular to discrete and insular minorities. Indeed, any resident in
the unconstitutional district, regardless of the resident's race or injury, could challenge these districts. 3 And now that the cause of action has been established, political interest groups have begun to use
Shaw to challenge funny looking districts, regardless of their racial
composition. Shaw's invocation of tradition is particularly inapt and
selective, given that it leaves out some of the most truly traditional
districting principles: namely, malapportionment and the use of districting to dilute minority votes and to entrench incumbent parties
and candidates.
The political party cases-the results in which I tend to agreealso provide examples of the Court's explicit or implicit reliance on
tradition, over minority rights or anti-entrenchment, to adjudicate
political controversies. In Jones, ' a majority of the members of both
parties supported the law (i.e., the law was not one party's attempt to
entrench itself at the other's expense), but the leaders of the party
(again, hardly a discrete or insular minority) successfully argued the
law violated the party's First Amendment associational rights. Indeed, proponents of the law justified it as a means of breaking the
stranglehold party leaders held on the nomination process and a way
of enfranchising independent voters that otherwise had no say in
primary elections. The Court, however, viewed the associational
40
rights claim as "consistent with [the] tradition" of political parties °apparently overlooking the strong anti-party tradition stretching from
Federalist No. 10 through the Progressive Era of enlisting the state in
breaking up and controlling party machines.
The reliance on the "traditional two-party system" in the ballot access cases also highlights the change in priorities regarding judicial
intervention into the political process. In these cases the Court has
not established a new cause of action; rather, it has codified tradition
.

38 See United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, (1995) (holding that any resident,
regardless of
race, has standing to bring a Shaw claim against his or her own district). On the problems of'
Shaw standing, see John Hart Ely, Standing '"oChallenge Pro-Minority Gerrymanders, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 576 (1997) (arguing in favor of the Court's holding in Hays); Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela
S. Karlan, Standing and Misunderstandingin Voting Rights Law, I1l HARV. L. REV. 2276 (1998)
(responding to Ely).
39 530 U.S. 567
(2000).
40 Id. at 574.
41 See generally Adam Winkler, Voters' Rights and Parties' Wrongs: Early Political Party Regulation
in the State Courts, 1886-1915, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 873 (2000) (describing early political party

cases).
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as a state interest. In Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party,2 the
Court upheld a ban on "fusion" candidacies that prevented minor
parties from nominating a candidate already nominated by a major
party. As with the blanket primary, proponents of fusion viewed it as
a means of increasing minority participation and challenging duopolistic control of the electoral process. Nevertheless, noting that the
law favored the "traditional two-party system," the Court found the
fusion ban tailored toward "temper[ing] the destabilizing effects of
party-splintering and excessive factionalism.'

3

To its credit, the

Court in Timmons at least paid heed to the tradition of fusion candidacies in the late-nineteenth century, although in most minor party
ballot access cases the vibrant political tradition of smaller parties gets
short shrift.
The Court's support for tradition in the political process cases is
not limited to the predictable coalition of the five more conservative
Justices. In U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,"' and Cook v. Gralike, ' for
example, Justice Stevens' opinions for the Court interpreted the Constitution as preventing states from indirectly or directly limiting the
terms of its Members of Congress. Although the debate in U.S. Term
Limits concerns federalism more than tradition per se, the fundamental question there was whether states could innovate beyond the congressional qualifications listed in the Constitution to add a limit on
terms. Consistent with its rejection of other political innovations, the
Court said no.
CONCLUSION
What began as a judicial revolution to expand the franchise and
break political lock-ups has matured into opportunities for partisan
manipulation and judicial reinforcement of traditional power structures. It is worth considering whether this entire enterprise, on balance, has done more harm than good. To engage in the inquiry is, I
admit, somewhat akin to asking how many angels can dance on the
head of a pin. Judicial involvement in politics is here to stay, so time
might be more fruitfully spent in justifying when courts should be involved rather than whether they should have ever waded into the political thicket. Moreover, all would admit that some judicial involvement is necessary to prevent the worst abuses by political actors: for
example, outright disfranchisement, Soviet-style ballots, or draconian
political speech codes.

42

520 U.S. 351 (1997).

43

Id. at 367.

44 514
45 531

U.S. 779 (1995).
U.S. 510 (2001).
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Nevertheless, I think a good argument can be made that judicial
involvement in politics-whatever its philosophic appeal-has disserved the values that formed its original justification. Although the
one-person, one-vote rule may have led to greater representation of
urban areas and temporary reshuffling of the political structure, decennial redistricting has allowed parties and incumbents to make
elections less competitive, and has often created legislatures that are
less representative. Although the Court's discovery of the right to
vote led it to strike down poll taxes, most of the "important" moves in
expanding the franchise were accomplished through constitutional
amendments that prevented discrimination in the right to vote based
on race, gender, age and (even) failure to pay a poll tax. It was Congress, moreover, through the Voting Rights Act, that eliminated literacy tests the Court had upheld earlier as constitutional and put teeth
in federal protections of voting rights for racial minorities. Admittedly, the Court was indispensable in enforcing these pro-minority
laws and amendments. In most cases, however, an interpretive regime that clung closely to the available text rather than dangerously
expanding judicial authority in service of the Carolene Products-type
values would have proven sufficient to prevent the disturbing types of
laws that export political costs onto unrepresented and powerless
groups.
Although no one can deny that judicial intervention has sometimes done wonders in the service of protecting minorities and breaking political lockups, the recent political process caselaw has placed a
lot of weight on the other side of the balance. Plaintiffs have successfully used the Fourteenth Amendment precedents on behalf of partisan interests often completely at odds with the pro-minority and antientrenchment principles. And the courts have used their relatively
new role in the political arena to shore up traditional power structures and even impose their own partisan preferences.
This balancing of the pros and cons of judicial involvement in
politics is not merely an academic enterprise. It should serve as a
warning shot to those who would expand judicial authority into uncharted territory.4' The history of lawsuits brought against the government in order to control it teaches us lessons about the unintended consequences of constitutional innovation. It should caution
us against further steps down the same or similar roads. With each
new constitutional rule or judicial accretion of power comes the risk
that the next Court will justify an incremental move in the direction
ideologically opposite to its predecessor. Those of us who advocate
4,;

See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: PartisanLockups of the

Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REv. 643 (1998) (urging courts to become the equivalent of trustbusters of political cartels).
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such innovations should do so cautiously and humbly. For we may
later need to bear the responsibility for providing the weapons our
opponents use to injure the very groups we intended to help.

